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Abstract: This article explores continuities and discontinuities between two kinds of death in 
punishment: of death as punishment and of death as the specified detritus of punishment, 
life without parole (LWOP). It traces the parallel lives and equivalencies between life and 
death in penal policy and practice in the US, and attendant narratives of harshness/mildness, 
and compromises and covenants with pasts and futures. The discourse of death that has 
sustained the survival of the death penalty in the US has found a home in LWOP.  It argues 
that spectacles and memorialisations of injustice, error and pain circumscribed in the judicial 
and popular discourse of death as different provide spaces for reflection on dignity and 
cruelty, spaces in which the loss of life and liberty can be grieved, a subversive politics of 
mourning (Butler 2004) for those whom punishment had deemed dispensable.  As the death 
penalty is exchanged for LWOP, reform strategies need to reimagine and recapture these 
spaces for grieving, and understanding the death work of LWOP in US penal politics is crucial 
to this endeavour. 
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This article explores political and cultural sites of crossing in the US between two variants of 
death in punishment – of death as punishment and of death as the specified and sought-for 
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detritus of punishment – life without parole (LWOP).  To paraphrase Strauss (1966): ‘Death 
is good to think punishment with’ – in law, administration, witnessing or experiencing the 
unnatural state of death in censure and captivity.  The death penalty in the US has been 
explored, mapped out, and contested, as a ‘peculiar’ institution; a case of historical, penal 
and symbolic exceptionalism (Garland 2010; Zimring 2003), and scholars have sought to 
explore the parameters and contingencies of exceptionalism in historical and geographical 
terms (Whitman 2003; Garland 2002, 2010; Girling 2006; Sarat and Martchukat 2011; 
Zimring 2003).  Reflections on death in the discourse and grammar of punishment remain an 
important and timely project for academics and penal reformers.  The article explores the 
mythology of death in punishment and its place in two particular versions of life and death 
exchanges in the name of punishment in the US. The study of the ‘cultural life’ of capital 
punishment (Sarat and Boulanger 2005; Girling 2011; Seal 2014) is very much premised on 
the witnessing of its attendant judicial, political, administrative, and medicalised rituals 
(Sarat 2001b; Lynch 2000; Girling 2004; Kaufman-Osborn 2002). Yet such witnessing is 
absent in the attendant practices of LWOP and the very condition of invisibility or 
‘thoughtlessness’ is built into the history of emergence and grammar of LWOP as an 
alternative to a death sentence. This article explores possibilities and impasses of witnessing 
(seeing and seeing through) a new scene of death in punishment in the context of the 
political and cultural condition of invisibility of death in ordinary, banal, normalised carceral 
punishment, for the worst of the worst.  
 The global demise of the death penalty has been well documented (Hood and Hoyle 
2014), yet the life of death in punishment is anything but over; the diminishing number of 
death sentences and executions in the US belies the fact that a sentence of ‘death in 
punishment’ (LWOP) is now an increasingly prominent feature of American criminal justice.  
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The narrowing of the scope and scale of the application of the death penalty in the day-to-
day repertoire of criminal justice in the US (Zimring 2003; Garland 2010) has exchanged 
death through execution to death as an exit from penal institutions.  That one becomes the 
conduit of another is not contested – in the US, LWOP becomes an exit from death row as a 
policy trade-off (moratoria, state abolition of the death penalty, a compromise condition for 
extradition from abolitionist jurisdictions such as the European Union) and in terms of 
individual lives (plea bargaining, commutations from death row). 
 Narratives of the historical transformation of executions begin with the spectacle of 
the physical annihilation of the body (Foucault 1977) and seem to end with lethal injection, 
a private, ‘painless’ medicalised (Denno 2007), uneventful, ‘assisted’ crossing between life 
and death (Kaufman-Osborn 2002; Sarat 2001a; Denno 2007; Lynch 2000).  There are 
emerging narratives reflecting on continuities with another scene of death in punishment 
(Gottschalk 2014; Ogletree and Sarat 2012; Adelsberg, Guenther and Zeman 2015), that of 
LWOP as a replacement for execution, where death is the expected, yet uninvited, guest at 
the scene of punishment.  That attention must be shifted onto LWOP is a case that has been 
eloquently made (Gottschalk 2012, 2014; Adelsberg, Guenther and Zeman 2015; Dilts 2015).  
Yet the death penalty’s agility to survive challenges and adapt has enshrined it as both the 
‘masthead symbol’ of penal harshness and ‘risk-averse retributivism’ (Garland 2010, p.244) 
and as the focus of abolitionist and reform strategies.  By contrast, there is a comparatively 
deafening silence on the other lives of death in punishment and the challenge remains of 
‘figuring out how to make the carceral state … a leading political and public policy issue’ 
(Gottschalk 2014, p.2).  It is argued here that old and new abolitionist, and ‘smart on crime’ 
strategies alike, have failed to produce ‘replacement discourses’ (Henry and Milonavonic 
1996, p.204) and the discourse of death that supports and sustains the perseverance of the 
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death penalty in the US (Garland 2010), has found a home in the new penalties that have 
replaced executions. In the sections below I trace the parallel lives and equivalencies 
between life and death in penal policy and practice in the US, and their political and penal 
narratives of harshness and mildness, compromises and covenants with pasts and futures.  
Clearing out the Roots of Death in Punishment: New Abolitionist Strategies 
Understanding the legacy of death in the grammar of punishment in the US means 
apprehending the resonance of a particular long, contested, and very public, ‘doing away’ of 
the death penalty.  Foucault (2000) warned that the manner of abolition is as important as 
abolition itself: ‘The roots are deep. And many things will depend on how they are cleared 
out’ (p.459).  If there is no reimagining or challenging punishment for the incorrigible, if 
there is an easy-to-reach-for oubliette for those we cannot change then the ‘trap door 
through which the “incorrigible” will disappear is ready’ (Foucault 2000, pp.460–1; Dilts 
2015). 
 The death penalty has been regulated in the US as an apt, but rare, sentence 
reserved for the worst of the worst.  LWOP as a sanction in its own right had developed as a 
‘solution’ to the problem of the habitual offender (Gottschalk 2012).  Additionally, LWOP in 
retentionist states tends to be a statutory alternative to the death penalty for first degree 
murders depending either on the discretion of the prosecutor to pursue a capital charge or 
the failure to establish the presence/absence of aggravating/mitigating factors. The outright 
reluctant replacement of the death penalty by LWOP in abolitionist states in the face of 
costs and fallibility, has meant a cascading down of the ‘worst of the worst’ punitive 
rationality to stand alongside the harsh punishment for the habitual offender. The 
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confluence of the worst of the worst and habitual offender necessitates that we understand 
the cultural and political baggage of LWOP as an alternative to the death penalty.  
 There are two distinct phases and tropes of the abolitionist movement in the US 
since the 1960s – old abolitionism and new abolitionism (Sarat 1998). Old abolitionism 
sought to challenge the death penalty on the basis of the immorality and cruelty of killing 
another human being and triggered one of the most crippling moral and political impasses 
of identifying ‘whose side are you on’ in US penal politics (Sarat 2001a, 2002).  New 
abolitionism gained ground as a strategy for political and judicial challenge of the death 
penalty after the stampede to reinvent and re-establish the constitutionality of state 
sentencing practices in a ‘mean spirited revisionism’ (Sarat 1998, p.6) in response to the 
effective judicial abolitionism after Furman v. Georgia (408 US 238 (1972)) between 1972 
and 1976.  New abolitionism placed fairness and fallibility, not the dignity of the offender, as 
the source and focus of concern. The offender is effaced and becomes a stand-in for the 
innocent accused, the poor accused, the juvenile accused, the intellectually disabled 
accused, the African American accused, and the hurdles in their search for justice in the 
American criminal justice system. Concerns about the dignity of the offender and the 
constitutionality of the death penalty itself were replaced with concerns about the 
efficiency and fallibility of the system.   
 Narratives about the inherent cruelty of executions and of the dignity of the 
offender are muted in the search for a pragmatic consensus on a morally-contested issue 
(Sarat 2001b; Simon 2014). Human rights/dignity concerns that animated European death 
penalty abolitionism (Girling 2006) and which led to successful challenges and recent 
‘cascades’ of mildness towards life-limiting sentences in Europe (van Zyl Smit, Weatherby, 
and Creighton 2014; Simon 2014) have not been nurtured, nor have they found legal 
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comfort in Supreme Court decision making. Nevertheless, some discourses of cruelty and 
dignity persisted in the spectacle of contestation of death penalty practices, and the 
conditions and echoes of their emergence and survival are important.  First, the cruelty and 
suffering of being unjustly selected to die and awaiting unjust punishment is central to late 
20th/early 21st Century abolitionist strategies, where error in criminal justice is embodied in 
the unjust suffering of the innocent accused/condemned.  However, the economy of cruelty 
and undeserved/deserved pain/dignity underpinning such strategies, echoes the appeal to 
the innocent victim, which resonates with the discourses of retribution and its victim service 
symbolism in US penal culture(s) (Zimring 2003). Second, the cruelty of experiencing, and 
the problem of witnessing, pain and its indignities during executions, have been key 
battlegrounds of legal and political challenges to the death penalty (see below).  The fates 
and prospect of these discourses in LWOP has important implications. 
 The inheritance or ‘cascading’ of a moral economy of cruelty and suffering from the 
new abolitionist tradition of death penalty politics towards other ‘life’-limited sentences has 
become a point of reflection in abolitionist and academic writing (for example, Simon 2014). 
Simon (2014) argues for a politics of hope that embraces and acknowledges the historical 
cruelty of abolition; and hopes and works towards a ‘dignity cascade’ eliminating harsh 
punishments (p.489) after death penalty abolition. He suggests that the death penalty’s 
‘metaphoric and discursive role’ anchors a structure of extreme punishment in a way that 
LWOP does not. Yet there are traces of the metaphoric and discursive role of the death 
penalty in LWOP which casts a shadow over LWOP for both incorrigible and the worst of the 
worst.  
 Derrida (2013) warns against complacency about the inevitability of ending death in 
punishment in an era of apparent global successes in abolition:  
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Even when the death penalty will have been abolished … Other ﬁgures will be 
found for it; other ﬁgures will be invented for it, other turns in the 
condemnation to death ... (pp.282–3) 
Both old and new abolitionism seek to divert the rule of law from resorting to the death 
penalty (Adelsberg, Guenther and Zeman 2015, p.87) – rationalising death out of 
punishment.  They make no attempt to curtail the sovereign imagination of punishment of 
the power over life and death and, furthermore, as I will go on to show below, they nurture 
and draw on that imagination.  For Simon (2014), the cost of rationalising death out of 
punishment could be set in a genealogy of punishment where ‘utilitarian gains, proper legal 
procedures and well-disciplined prisons, absorbed the cruelty of earlier rituals without 
fundamentally altering it’ (p.486).  The rest of this article is concerned with this ‘absorption’ 
and its implication at this particular historical juncture. 
Death Penalty Exceptionalism and LWOP: Parallel Lives and Deadly Symbiosis 
New abolitionism and the propensity of American federalism to foster pockets of resistance 
to reform (Zimring 2003; Garland 2010) has fostered, over the last 50 years, a spectacle of 
executions in which pragmatic concerns about the ability of the US criminal justice system 
take centre stage alongside a spectacle of judicial eagerness to ‘tinker with the machinery of 
death’ (Justice Blackmun dissenting in Callins v. Collins (510 US 1141 (1994)), to provide 
sustainable and constitutional futures for the death penalty. This space of work and contest 
over death as punishment has shored up a clear judicial and popular distinction between 
death and life as punishment.  Since the 1970s and the Furman decision there has been a 
popular, judicial, and political, articulation of the exceptionalism of the death penalty (in 
terms of its impact and meanings) and in terms of a special duty of care placed on the 
criminal justice system and its actors.  Supreme Court death penalty jurisprudence 
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developed after Furman reiterated a persistent and ‘enduring argument’ (Abramson 2004, 
p.117) that the death penalty is so different from any other punishment that it requires 
extraordinary prudence and a maze of procedural protections for those finding themselves 
within its remit to avoid error (both in judgments of guilt and deadworthiness).  The 
discourse of difference between life and death as punishment foregrounds death’s severity 
and irrevocability. 
 At the same time, the death penalty was presumed to be amenable ‘to meaningful 
judicial restriction’ (Steiker and Steiker 2014, p.204), unlike LWOP in particular and mass 
incarceration in general (Gottschalk 2012), where there has been comparatively little and 
hard-won judicial oversight.  Steiker and Steiker (2014) argue that the hive of judicial activity 
and Supreme Court interventions in death penalty cases ‘fuels the (mis)perception that all 
areas of criminal justice worthy of regulation are in fact subject to regulation through the 
courts’ (p.204). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has ensured that procedural protections 
allowed for capital cases do not ‘bleed out’ (Gottschalk 2012, pp.230–2) in non-capital 
sentences and processes. By fiercely protecting the idea that death is different, it seems that 
this spectacle of judicial intervention in capital cases may have left LWOP in a judicial 
wilderness of fettered discretion of individual states, juries and automatic sentencing.   
Capital cases and their journey through the courts, established a temporality and spatiality 
of work and challenge which mirrors the journey of the defendant/condemned towards the 
execution chamber.  The progression towards an execution after sentencing both 
punctuates time and offers windows for challenge and intervention.  This is a 
temporality/spatiality absent from LWOP sentences and this is of practical and symbolic 
significance for challenges, mobilisation, and intervention, in such cases. 
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 During this time of work for the death penalty there was a silent, but inexorable, rise 
of the use of LWOP. Three factors are widely cited as contributing to its ascendance: the rise 
of penal populism since the 1980s, the war on drugs, and the ratcheting up of sentencing 
tariffs and sentences of which LWOP became the apex (for example, Gottschalk 2014; Nellis 
2013; Travis 2014). The harshness in sentencing increasingly came to be marked by the 
withdrawal of discretion (mandatory sentencing), as well as by sentence length. The rise of 
the truth-in-sentencing movement (Nellis 2013) limited opportunities/eligibility for parole, 
and ‘locked prisoners’ into a covenant with their past, foreclosing possibly lenient parole 
decisions. 
 The ‘historical thoughtlessness’ of the adoption of LWOP since the 1980s (Berry 
2015, pp.6–7) is in sharp contrast to the increased judicial and activist scrutiny of capital 
sentencing of the ‘death is different’ doctrine which drove executions to an effective 
standstill around the same time.  This disparity provided both practical and symbolic 
incentives to individual states, criminal actors, and jurors, to consider and replace LWOP as 
alternatives to death sentences.  New abolitionism’s appeal to restraint and rationality 
contributed to the ascendance of LWOP as an alternative to the death penalty; LWOP 
provided a logical, practical, tested and, as I will illustrate below, satisfying, alternative to 
the death penalty for offenders convicted of capital crimes.  
 Consequently, whereas the death penalty in the US was marked as a space for 
judicial and popular reflection, LWOP was marked not only by historical thoughtlessness, 
but as a sentence without space for reflection, without any judicial and personal mirrors of 
recognition either for the judicial process or for ‘the other’ finding themselves within its 
scope. It developed as mandatory (in most cases), with little to no space for consideration of 
mitigating factors (except for juveniles), no automatic review process, no procedural 
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safeguards (regarding representation) and only a theoretical possibility of executive 
clemency (Henry 2012). There is no space for an ‘express lever of mercy’ fostered through 
due process on jury decision making and no ‘reasonable deliberation over equitable 
blameworthiness’ (Bowers 2012, p.25). Unlike the death penalty, opportunities for revision 
through political deliberation (executive clemency) even though available in theory, are, in 
practice, virtually non-existent, especially for cases involving murder (American Civil 
Liberties Union 2014).  
 The ‘death is different’ argument has been increasingly challenged by both 
academics (Berry 2010; Ogletree and Sarat 2012; Adelsberg, Guenther and Zeman 2015) and 
penal reformers, and for a specific category of offenders (juvenile offenders) and by the 
Supreme Court itself in Graham v. Florida (130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010)).  It is variously described 
as ‘Death by Incarceration’ (CADBI 2015) ‘worse than death’ (Cockburn 2009), living death 
(American Civil Liberties Union 2014), a ‘different death penalty’ (Dow 2012), a ‘death 
penalty in disguise’ (Almenara and van Zyl Smit 2015).  Ogletree and Sarat (2012), amongst 
others, point out that that death is not really all that different and there is a need ‘to 
confront the possibility that LWOP may well be the new capital punishment, with all of its 
baggage – but none of its process’ (p.21).  
 As Henry (2012) and Berry (2010) compellingly demonstrate, the legal doctrine of 
‘death is different’ does not hold well under close scrutiny when considering the current 
practices of LWOP. The rejection of rehabilitation is part of a shared logic of feasibility and 
desirability of eternal exclusion removing the offender as a calculable, yet immutable, risk to 
the public.  The ‘special irrevocability’ of death key in the ‘death is different’ doctrine bears 
more than a family resemblance to the lack of scrutiny and effective review of LWOP cases. 
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The denial of spaces for measured and equitable deliberation may mean that, in practice (if 
not in theory), a sentence is bulletproofed against revision and is effectively irrevocable.  
 Justice Kennedy, in Graham v. Florida, in considering the constitutionality of LWOP 
for juveniles, traces similarities between LWOP and the death sentence, and especially the 
issue of irrevocability.  He acknowledges the possibility of clemency for LWOP but noted 
that the remoteness and likelihood of an individual making effective use of mechanisms for 
release are so slim as to have no mitigation on the harshness of the sentence (Graham, 130 
S.Ct. 2027–2030 (2010)). This ‘irrevocable judgment about the person’s value and place in 
society ‘ (at p.2030) is a motif of the Graham decision that acknowledged that for juveniles, 
LWOP was sufficiently like a death sentence to merit protections reserved for the death 
sentence (that is, ensuring the due consideration of mitigating circumstances).  This 
irrevocable judgment binds the hands of the decision makers, not only at some distant 
future execution, but from the very moment of judgment of those condemned to LWOP.   
Revolutions and Revelations: The Decision not to Decide and the Reluctant Abolitionist 
Concerns about innocence have played a key role in articulating the problem of the death 
penalty in the media and in the courts. The innocence frame, in particular, is one that has 
dominated reporting and brought about tangible changes in death penalty practice, 
resulting in an increase in the number of states adopting LWOP as an alternative 
(Baumgartner, De Boef and Boydstun 2008). The innocence revolution (Marshall 2004; 
Steiker 2005) effectively challenged the ability of the system to distinguish the innocent 
from the guilty and to adequately and timely respond to their claims.  
 In the early 2000s, seemingly state after state, case after case, and issue after issue, 
raised concerns about the fallibility of the process (see Steiker 2005).  The first decade of 
the 21st Century was marked by executions as the spectacle of error and the fallibility of 
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judgment.  The innocence revolution appeared to convert a number of high-profile 
supporters of the death penalty and to turn strongholds of the death penalty, such as 
Illinois, into abolitionist states (Warden 2005).  The foregrounding of innocence, and 
especially the prominence of actual innocence cases in public debates, precluded principled 
objections to the practice of the death penalty itself (see Steiker and Steiker 2005) and left 
debates about how we should punish the guilty, to the punitive imagination.  Additionally, 
the discourse of innocence in a perverse way is not about the defendant at all; as I have 
argued elsewhere the displacement of death is very much driven by a decision not to decide 
death and evading the moral burden of a fallible and irrevocable penal decision (Girling 
2011).   
 Concerns about fairness and disproportionate pursuance and application of the 
sentence of death based on race of the offender and victim, showed promise in terms of 
challenging death penalty practice and support.  These challenges revealed a system that, in 
making use of politically and judicially much hard-fought-after equitable discretion, evoked 
and summoned the ghosts and the burdens of race and lynching (Kaufman-Osborn 2006; 
Ogletree 2002).  These ghosts have been particularly resistant to reform, as the troubled 
history of the North Carolina Racial Justice Act 2009, and its repeal, show.  The haunting of 
race in capital punishment continues in a number of high-profile cases (for example, Gary 
Graham – executed 2000; Troy Davis – executed 2011; George Stinney’s posthumous 
exoneration in 2014 for 1944 execution).  LWOP as a penal exit strategy absolves decision 
makers (legislators, prosecutors, jurors, judges) of making inequitable decisions which may 
result in death.  The displacement discourse is one of absolution, the moral washing of the 
hands in the decision to end life, a decision not to decide death.  This displacement 
discourse of absolution is one that goes beyond a decision to avoid an error of judgment; it 
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is also a decision not to trust the state to take life.  During the long, protracted, but recently 
successful, campaign to repeal the death penalty in Nebraska, those deciding were urged 
not to consider whether some people deserve to die but ‘do they trust an error-prone 
government to fairly, efficiently and properly administer a program that metes out death to 
its citizens?’ (Berman 2015).  Yet at the same time, the state is entrusted unconditionally 
with the whole lives and deaths in penal institutions. 
 The wider ‘smart on crime’ rhetoric in American criminal justice is very much 
concerned with the social benefits of alternative sanctions (Steiker 2014, p.212) and appears 
to be making some, albeit slow, headway as a public rationale for recent repeals of death 
penalty legislation (for example, Maryland 2013; Nebraska 2015).  As Steiker (2014) notes: 
‘the thrust of the contemporary movement is that our death penalty – the prevailing 
American practice – is simply too costly along several dimensions with insufficient benefits 
to justify retention’ (p.212).  
 Yet not only has there been a failure to replace the moral discourse of retribution, 
deterrence and incapacitation of death in punishment but LWOP was measured against it 
and found not to be wanting.  In Baze v. Rees (553 US 35 (2008)), Justice Stevens reflected 
on the erosion of justifications for the death penalty: the weakening of incapacitation 
arguments in light of the introduction of LWOP, the undermining of appeals to deterrence 
by the lack of consensus on its efficacy and the incompatibility between retributive 
justifications and the tide towards humanising executions. 
 The perceived requirements of swiftness, severity and certainty, that have beset 
common sense and some academic discourses as conditions for effective deterrence, find 
little comfort in the current practice of the death penalty in the US (Sunstein and Vermuille 
2005; Steiker 2005; Donohue and Wolvers 2005) and appear to be satisfied by LWOP. The 
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sentence is immediate with no delay, no ‘second lifetime’ on death row. It appears not to 
overpromise and under-deliver death, like the death penalty with its many exits, delays and 
judicial and political uncertainty. It does what it says on the tin – you die in prison, little 
possibility of review of the case, review of sentence, mercy. It, thus, appeases a greater 
range of retributive demands than the current ‘peculiar form’ of the institution of the death 
penalty in the US (Garland 2010). 
 LWOP could also be said to satisfy the victim service symbolism (Zimring 2003, 
pp.60–2) of American capital punishment.  LWOP is a covenant with victims that can be 
kept, not at the moment of death, but in the finality and unconditionality of the sentence. 
LWOP has been argued to give ‘a sense of personal control to the victims’ (Barrile 2014, 
p.241) by not fostering a lingering ‘involuntary relationship’ between the offender and the 
survivor through the maze of appeals, process and ritual of capital cases. 
 The harshness of LWOP provides reassurance for reluctant converts, such as 
Governor Richardson of New Mexico.  His support for abolishing the death penalty was 
reported as marking the abolition of the death penalty as a victory for keeping New Mexico 
safer: 
We now have the option of sentencing the worst criminals to life in prison without 
the possibility of parole. They will never get out of prison. Faced with the reality that 
our system for imposing the death penalty can never be perfect, my conscience 
compels me to replace the death penalty with a solution that keeps society safe. 
(Death Penalty Information Centre 2009) 
Prior to this announcement on ‘smart penalties’, Richardson visited maximum-security units 
for LWOP after which he announced that: ‘Those cells are something that may be worse 
than death’ … ’I believe this is a just punishment’ (Associated Press 2009). This has been 
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precisely the political sell of LWOP in light of the decision not to decide death in US criminal 
justice.  
 The state of California and the fates of recent proposals to replace the death penalty 
with LWOP encapsulate the political appeal of the harshness of ‘smart on crime’ reform.  
During the campaign for the SAFE California Act (Proposition 34) the conditions of LWOP 
took centre stage in the campaign alongside fiscal and utilitarian questions of its 
comparative efficacy and cost. The proposal, for all intents and purposes, recasts and 
reinforces the victim service symbolism of the death penalty into a new victim and 
community service symbolism for LWOP.  Voters were promised that those convicted would 
have to ‘work within a high security prison as many hours of faithful labour in each day and 
every day during his or her term of imprisonment’ (California Legislative Information 2011), 
and their wages would be subject to deduction for victim restoration/restitution.  It also 
offered to transfer projected savings from the changes (100 million over four years) to local 
law enforcement budgets in order to enhance the investigation of homicide and sex 
offences (California Legislative Information 2011).  The campaign addressed concerns about 
fiscal costs and offered narratives of opportunity costs for both law enforcement and 
victims’ families if the death penalty was not abolished (Dilts 2015, pp.109–12).  However, it 
also proposed to suspend all litigation and appeals by existing death row prisoners.  This 
disregard for abolitionist hard-won ground over the prevalence of error in capital cases was 
a cause for concern (Dilts 2015; Simon 2014). The opportunity costs establish and support a 
new victim service symbolism which promises certainty in both punishment and the severity 
of punishment, and appeals to the punitive reality and certainty of LWOP in the face of 
persistent and long-standing challenges to the fallibility of death sentences.  As Dilts (2015) 
argues, it promises security, safety, AND harshness, in an age of austerity and limited 
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resources. This penal rhetoric is sustained by an unchallenged moral economy of harshness 
and exclusion (both physical and judicial silencing) in the punishment of the worst of the 
worst.  
The Spectacle of Mercy and Museums of Rage 
Legal strategies for challenging executions since Furman (1972) and the ensuing spectacle of 
mitigation, delay, mercy (and its denial) (Alfieri 1996; Girling 2011) are deeply embedded in 
the cultural lives of the death penalty in the US.  This is a spectacle which is not afforded, 
finds no stage and no witnesses in LWOP. 
 States that recently repealed the death penalty from their statute replaced 
punishment for the worst of the worst with LWOP (Death Penalty Information Centre 2013) 
and in the process, injected different versions of mandatory sentencing.  Mandatory 
sentencing meant that the harshest sentence was no longer the subject of equitable 
discretion and that opportunities for individualised sentencing during the sentencing 
process, and beyond it, were severely curtailed.  This stands in sharp contrast to the 
complex jurisprudence developed after Furman to ensure consideration of mitigating 
factors in capital trials, with juries offered guided discretion and penalty phase trials for 
consideration of both aggravating and mitigating factors before deciding on 
deadworthiness.  It seems that in most cases of recent repeals of death sentences, the role 
of mitigation for the most serious of cases has been eroded, and the legal and practical 
scope of narratives of mercy is all but absent in most states’ process of meting out LWOP 
(Death Penalty Information Centre 2013).  Clemency in capital cases can be seen as 
‘remembering the future, of memorialising miscarriages of justice, a way of ensuring the 
future remembers’ (Sarat 2009, p.238) both as ‘a kind of testimony, and a way of recording 
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a history of injustice’ (p.238).  The ‘guided discretion’ of capital sentencing schemes since 
the 1970s aiming to deliver equitable declarations of deadworthiness can also be said to 
have provided opportunities, first, for narratives of mercy and narratives of hope during the 
trial, but also for yet another testimony, another record of a denial of mercy which could be 
unpicked during the appeals and clemency process.  Thus, LWOP as an exit and a declaration 
of lifeworthiness has been described as a ‘conflicted’ punishment (Lerner 2013) because 
those ending up in LWOP, with its covenants of denial of hope, have had to demonstrate 
that they are worthy of mercy and hope (Lerner 2013).  
 The case of juvenile defendants facing LWOP came into sharp relief in a number of 
recent decisions which appear to reintroduce the aspirations of mitigation and 
individualised sentencing in the mandatory frameworks of LWOP. In a series of decisions in 
Graham v. Florida (2010) and Miller v. Alabama (132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)) the US Supreme 
Court asserted the importance of age as a mitigating factor and of individualised LWOP 
sentencing for juveniles (Fiorillo 2013).  The special status of the juvenile LWOP defendant 
rested with the argument in Graham v. Florida that ‘LWOP is different’ for a juvenile 
defendant LWOP and more like a death sentence, because the juvenile offender will spend a 
larger proportion of their lifetime in prison (see Fiorillo 2013).  It was this analogy between a 
LWOP and a death sentence for a juvenile offender that re-established the importance of 
individualised sentencing for juvenile offenders in LWOP cases. 
 LWOP generally remains insular and insulated from the processes of individualised 
sentencing and the memorialisation of judgment, mercy, and error, that have come to 
define the legal and cultural production of death sentences in the last 50 years.  Blecker 
(2010), a proponent of the death penalty, makes a cutting point that those arguing for 
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LWOP as a replacement for the death penalty are supporting an equally retributivist 
‘irrationally preoccupied with the past’ sanction: 
When we sentence to LWOP, we irrevocably pledge at this moment forever: We will 
never let our rage and disgust disintegrate and deteriorate. LWOP creates a binding 
commitment now and forever never to think differently, or feel different – when the 
future becomes the present and the present is now past. (Blecker 2010, pp.12–13) 
LWOP memorialises our rage without the contested and subversive memorialisations of 
injustice (historical and present), mercy, dignity and lifeworthiness that the very flawed 
death penalty system in the US has done over the last 25 years. 
Mirrors of Recognition: Doing Death and the Politics of Mourning 
Botched executions are subversive, unmasking the brutality of the violence of the law as 
commensurable to the criminal act (Sarat 2014).  The effacing of pain (and to some extent 
death itself) at the point of execution has become the motif of this differentiation in the US.   
 The introduction of lethal injection in 1982 augured a medicalised aesthetics of 
execution preoccupied with the experience and control of pain and its expression and 
witnessing during executions (Sarat 2001a; Kaufman-Osborn 2002, 2011; Denno 2007).  The 
drug protocols of lethal injection as a method of execution in the US since its adoption 
inscribed an aspiration for an unfeeling, unconscious body before the killing. This 
‘anesthetisation logic’ (Kaufman-Osborn 2011) of execution is concerned primarily, not with 
the experience of pain by the subject, but with the possibility of communication of pain 
during the execution ritual (Kaufman-Osborn 2011).  Like the prisoner in the Panopticon, the 
anaesthetised condemned is ‘seen, but he does not see; he is the object of information, 
never a subject in communication’ (Foucault 1977, p.200).  The death of the convicted is 
rendered a non-event (see Kaufman-Osborn 2002; Lynch 2000), the ending of life entombed 
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within the anaesthetised unmarked physical body of the condemned where there should be 
nothing for the witness to see.  The death work of execution is shown by Kaufman Osborn 
(2002, 2011) to be ‘haunted by the ideal of a death sentence the infliction of which is so 
imperceptible that it elides the act of killing’ (Kaufman-Osborne 2011, p.235) where the 
dignity of the process means that the spectator sees nothing, no ‘life excision’ (p.235) 
without having to avert their gaze. The simulation of a medicalised natural good death on 
the body of the condemned permeates the rituals and processes of execution in the US.  
The performance of, and futile search for, painless uneventful death by lethal injection has 
highlighted a retributive gap between the humanising of executions and retributive force of 
condemnation for the worst of the worst. Lynch (2000) observed, even before the main 
judicial battle over methods of execution in the first decade of the 21st Century, that the 
transformation of the death penalty into a painless, uneventful disposal, with the 
introduction of lethal injection in the late 1970s, would eventually render the death penalty 
‘obsolete’ and ‘superfluous’ because it would fail to appease the retributive call by 
supporters of the death penalty demanding a measure of pain for the pain those executed 
have inflicted on others (pp.25–6). Practical and legal challenges over botched executions, 
process, drug protocols and availability, have periodically curtailed executions in a number 
of states and have staged a judicial spectacle of a chimeric search for the modicum of pain 
that would not constitute ‘cruel and unusual punishment’. Similar to clemency petitions, 
challenges to methods of execution can be said to serve as contested memorialisations of 
pain and the embodiment of the condemned; an embodiment which is elided and rendered 
meaningless at the final staging of modern executions.  
 The discourse of a search for dignified and painless death in recent political and 
cultural narratives around physician-assisted suicide in the US (Curran 1997; Weiss 2014), 
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has further problematised the witnessing of dying without pain in the execution chamber. 
This medicalised palliative staging in which the taking of life ‘assume[s] the character of a 
depoliticized humanitarian (non)event, a painless matter of putting someone “to sleep”’ 
(Kaufman-Osborn 2002, p.69) challenges notions of least eligibility.  A good death, as the 
Supreme Court reminds us in two decisions, years apart, by Scalia in Callins v. Collins (1994) 
and more recently, in Glossip v. Gross, often eludes the law abiding.  ‘After all, while most 
humans wish to die a painless death, many do not have that good fortune’ (Glossip v. Gross, 
576 US 4 (2015)). 
 These discourses and conditions of dignity, pain and witnessing have ‘sunk their 
teeth’, to paraphrase Derrida, into the death work of LWOP.  Both the death penalty and 
LWOP encounter death as a limit but in both, the taking of life is elided – in the death 
penalty through lethal injection and the anesthetisation logic, in LWOP through the vagaries 
of a ‘natural’ unalleviated death. In the death penalty the witness need not avert their gaze 
as there should be nothing to see, in LWOP there is no event to see and no need for a 
witness.  There are many expositions about the conditions of life and death and the 
privations suffered by those serving sentences of LWOP (for example, Gottschalk 2012; 
Dayan 2011).  In both executions by lethal injection and ‘natural’ deaths in LWOP, the state 
simulates and redefines its limits as health and dignity provider.  Moreover, unlike modern-
day executions, LWOP seems to appease both the moral comfort procedures of a state and 
actors who have made a decision not to decide and never to look back on their original 
decision, extending to leaving indeterminate and to the vagaries of nature, the manner and 
time of death.  At the same time, there are glimpses and imaginings of suffering in the ‘hell 
holes and purgatories’ (Jewkes 2014) of such detention, glimpses that the modern lethal 
injection process not only denies, but also reassures the witness that they are not part of 
21 
 
the bargain of punishment.  It is sometimes claimed that medicine saved the death penalty 
(Denno 2007).  It could be said that nature is keeping death alive in American penal politics 
in what may be its final transformation. 
 Garland (2010) suggested that the death penalty in the US is ‘hypersignificant 
because it talks of killing and death and makes that talk pleasurable and empowering’ 
(p.304).  He goes on to argue that the capital punishment system today is ‘primarily a 
communication system’ (p.312), in which that which is performed is ‘discourse and debate’ 
(p.312).  Yet this discourse and debate are more than just about death and vengeance and 
the popular sovereign imagination suggested by Garland. The spectacles and 
memorialisations of injustice, error and pain reflect on dignity and cruelty and create spaces 
in which the loss of life and liberty can be grieved, a subversive politics of mourning (Butler 
2004) for those whom punishment had deemed dispensable.  In the twilight of the death 
penalty and its coexistence and replacement with LWOP, it is important to work towards a 
politics of mourning for those (un)grievable (Butler 2004) lives within it.  It may be that, as 
Simon (2014) suggested, the ‘metaphoric and discursive role’ of the death penalty is a 
scaffold supporting ‘a larger structure of extreme punishment’ (p.486) and that its 
dismantling may create cascades of dignity providing hope for a reform of other extreme 
punishments such as LWOP.  Here I illustrated some of these metaphoric and discursive 
roles, but also demonstrated that new reform strategies would also need to reimagine and 
recapture the spaces for grieving that have come to define the political and cultural lives of 
the production of the death penalty in the US, and which have been designed out of LWOP. 
 LWOP entombs moral comforts in an era of uncertainty and becomes a museum of 
rage; it is a place both to forget and to imagine.  It embodies places both beyond, and after, 
judgment, delimited by technocratic, neoliberal strategies; a ‘room of requirement’, to 
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paraphrase J.K. Rowling (2003), for moral comfort and horrible imaginings. Those serving 
LWOP are often said to be ‘doing life’ in prison.  They are also ‘doing death’ for us. 
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